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本文以 2004-2008 年 A 股所有非金融类上市公司为总样本，一共 5801 个观

























































Cash holding has always been a hot and controversial topic in academic circles 
and industry. As one of the ten unsolved problems in financial studies (Brealey and 
Myers, 1996), Cash holding decision not only reflects the financial and operational 
strategy of a company, but also is closely related to its internal governance and 
external environment. Both investors and managers pay much attention to the 
question whether the excess cash is value creating or value destroying. As an 
important mechanism of investor protection, scholars abroad consider crosslisting to 
be effective in preventing insiders from stealing cash from the company; and we 
examine whether and how crosslisting can mitigate the risk that insiders expropriate 
cash thus increase the value of excess cash.  
Based on the sample of all the non-financial companies listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Market from 2004 to 2008, altogether 5801 observations, we use 
Dittmar’s(2007) simulation model to measure the normal cash，and study how cash 
holdings affect the market value of a company. The residual of this normal cash 
regression is defined as excess cash(Xcash). Then, we measure investors’ valuation of 
firms’ excess cash holdings in order to investigate that, comparing to those 
non-crosslisting companies, how and how much the crosslisting behavior will affect 
the valuation of the companies’ cash holdings. 
This paper includes six parts. Part 1 introduces research background, contents 
and significance, the framework of this paper. Part 2 introduces the summary of the 
theories in and abroad on crosslisting and investor protection. Part 3 introduces 
literature reviews on valuation of firms’ cash holdings, including the determinants of 
cash holdings and theories on cash holding decision. Part 4 is about the research 
design, which describes details of the data sources, sample selection, the definition 
and calculation of research variables, theoretical analysis and research hypostheses. 
The content of part 5 is description and analysis of the empirical results. Part 6 is the 
conclusion of the study and enlightenment of this paper, and we also put forward the 
















Based on our empirical study, this paper finds that: 
Firstly, for Chinese listed companies, the market valuation of excess cash is 
discounted seriously. Our results reveal that for each yuan of excess cash, the 
company will suffer a 0.009-yuan value loss. Secondly, The lower the level of 
investor protection, the greater the excess cash is discounted. Generally, State-owned 
companies and companies with higher degree of concentration of ownership suffer 
greater value loss. 
However, firms can take effective actions to cut back a substantial source of 
value loss by crosslisting. It is found that crosslisting can contribute an extra value of 
0.072 yuan, thus makes a “crosslisting premium” for the crosslisted companies. Our 
analyses underline that by crosslisting, companies can effectively deliver a signal of 
its higher level of corporate governance. 
Finally, the “crosslisting premium” stems not only from improvement on 
corporate governance owing to stricter legal constraint and higher disclosure 
requirement but also from greater external monitoring pressure.      
Overall, since investors’ valuation of excess cash mirrors how they expect the 
cash to be used, our analysis shows that in Chinese market, crosslisting can constraint 
insiders’ inefficient allocation of corporate cash reserves significantly, thus increase 
the value of excess cash. 
 






































































Table of Contents 
VII 
 
Table of Contents 
PART 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................1 
Section 1 Research Background ..........................................................................1 
Section 2 Research Topics and Significance .......................................................2 
Section 3 Research Method and Framework .....................................................4 
PART 2 THEORIES OF CROSSLISTING............................................7 
Section 1 Bonding Theory ....................................................................................7 
Section 2 Investor Protection and Firm Value....................................................8 
Section 3 Information Environment and Firm Value ........................................9 
Section 4 Chinese Samples and Empirical Studies...........................................10 
PART 3 LITERATURES REVIEW......................................................14 
Section 1 Cash Holding Theories and Literatures ...........................................14 
Section 2 Research Literatures of the Value of Excess Cash...........................17 
Section 3 Related Research Literatures in China ............................................18 
PART 4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND DESIGN.........................21 
Section 1 Theories Analysis and Hypothesis.....................................................21 
Section 2 Data Selection and Resources............................................................25 
Section 3 Definition and Calculation of Excess Cash ......................................26 
Section 4 Research Models .................................................................................29 
PART 5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS............................32 
Section 1 Descriptive Statistics Results and Analysis.......................................32 
Section 2 Regression Results and Analysis .......................................................33 
Section 3 Robustness Tests .................................................................................40 
PART 6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS .................................44 
Section 1 Conclusions .........................................................................................44 






















































叉上市（Crosslisting）成为国际金融市场的一大亮点。据统计，截至 2007 年 6
月，在伦敦证券交易所上市的外国公司达 670 家，在纽约证券交易所上市的为
                                                        















434 家，在纳斯达克上市的有 313 家①。 
在持续的海外上市热潮中，一大批中国优质企业也在海外上市。青岛啤酒在
香港联交所上市一个月后，于 1993 年 8 月 27 日便返回上海证交所挂牌上市，成
为国内首家跨境交叉上市企业。此后，陆续有 H 股、N 股的企业不断回到上海
和深圳证券交易所上市。尤其近年来，随着内地经济的快速发展，经济实力和居
民财富的快速增加，国内股市对扩容的承受能力不断增强，同时，在管理层的大
力推动下，H 股回归内地的现象越来越多。截至到 2008 年底，已有 48 家 H 股
企业回归 A 股市场融资上市。尤其是近几年来，随着中国石油、建设银行、中




更为发达、成熟的 H 股或者 N 股上市，随后才回到国内 A 股市场上市。 











早在 1936 年 Keynes（Keynes，1936）就提出公司现金持有的预防性动机 
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